Security

Codex Almost Built an Unauthenticated "Anyone Can Shut Down" API to Stop a Server.

HashiCorp co-founder Mitchell Hashimoto shared an incident with Codex: it tried to implement a server-stop feature as an unauthenticated network API.

· Huuush

Codex Almost Built an Unauthenticated "Anyone Can Shut Down" API to Stop a Server

Key takeaways

  1. 1HashiCorp co-founder Mitchell Hashimoto shared an incident at 5:18 AM (KST) on August 18, 2026. Codex tried to implement a server-stop feature as an unauthenticated network API.
  2. 2When Hashimoto replied only "I don't know about that," Codex corrected itself in 20 seconds: "stopping the server shouldn't be part of an unauthenticated API."
  3. 3Hashimoto put the cause on his own "lazy prompting" and stressed that output from AI coding agents needs review before merging, especially anything involving networking and authentication.
A silver padlock with its shackle open and a bundle of black Ethernet cables tied with Velcro on a black background

At 5:18 AM (KST) on August 18, 2026, HashiCorp co-founder Mitchell Hashimoto posted exactly what happened to him: "I was working on making a server stoppable from the CLI, and the best approach Codex picked was to plant an unauthenticated network API on every server so it could shut itself down." The post drew more than 78,000 views.

A Design Caught by the Creator of Terraform

Hashimoto co-founded HashiCorp and created Terraform, Vagrant, and Vault. He now builds the terminal app Ghostty and co-founded and leads Superlogical. What he wanted was a feature to find an already-built discovery server based on a local Unix socket and stop it gracefully. Instead, Codex chose to build a new network API that anyone could call to shut things down.

Why It Corrected Itself in 20 Seconds

Hashimoto replied with only "I don't know about that." After about 20 seconds of thinking, Codex concluded on its own that "stopping the server shouldn't be part of an unauthenticated network API." It noticed the problem even though he hadn't pointed it out specifically.

The Cause Was a "Lazy Prompt," Not the AI

Hashimoto put the responsibility for the incident on himself, not the AI. "Lazy prompting led the AI to think I wanted it to be able to stop any server I was talking to," he said. At the same time, he noted that "I was also the one who reviewed the result and found the problem," pointing out that using AI coding agents still requires a step where you actually review the output.

How Common Is This Pattern?

This case is one person's account, and no official reply from OpenAI has been confirmed. The post also doesn't state which model or reasoning effort was used. Replies did include similar stories from other developers saying "this happens about 1 in 50 to 100 times," along with advice that "adding a security review before merge catches this kind of thing." For output from AI coding agents, especially anything involving networking and authentication, it's safer to run a separate review before merging.

Frequently asked questions

What exactly happened in this incident?
While Mitchell Hashimoto was building a feature to stop a server from the CLI, Codex chose to build a new shutdown network API that anyone could reach without authentication on every server.
Whose account is this?
It's Mitchell Hashimoto, the HashiCorp co-founder who created Terraform, Vagrant, and Vault. He now builds Ghostty and co-founded and leads Superlogical.
Did Codex fix the problem on its own?
When Hashimoto replied only "I don't know about that," Codex corrected itself in 20 seconds: "stopping the server shouldn't be part of an unauthenticated network API." But it was Hashimoto's review that found the real problem first.
How can you prevent this kind of incident?
Hashimoto and the repliers recommended writing prompts more specifically and running a security review on output from AI coding agents before merging.

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